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FILE TITLE NUMBER/VOLUME:

2014 239298  
VOL. XVIII

INCLUSIVE DATES: \_\_\_\_\_

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_

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DELETIONS, IF ANY: \_\_\_\_\_  
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
DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/1/78	3/31/78	BETSY PALMER	<i>Betsy Palmer</i>
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DC DOCUMENT EXTRACT


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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
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		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	PARI-08784	4. DATE 08 JUN 63
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-293328	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

[Redacted] (201-293328)  
RE: OPS INTEREST [Redacted] (201-252799)

201-252798

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~201-293328~~

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
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16. PERTINENT INFORMATION:

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

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
EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

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SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION		
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT NO 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-	239	248	

FORM 10-64

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GROUP 1  
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(7-40)



FBI  
28 Feb 73

From-

Re

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# Costa Rican's Call for Talks With Castro Shocks Exiles

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY  
Star News Staff Writer

Costa Rica's President Jose Figueres has thrown the Western Hemisphere's half-million Cuban exiles into a state of shock by his declaration that they should seek a dialogue with Fidel Castro.

It happened at an exile banquet in San Juan, Puerto Rico, last week attended by many anti-Castro leaders and by the leading officials of the island commonwealth, including Luis Munoz Marin and the new governor, Rafael Hernandez Co. lon.

Figueres had seemed to be an ideal choice as the speaker to the exile leaders because no Latin American leader has been a more open and vigorous enemy of Castro. The occasion was the 120th birthday celebration of Jose Marti, Cuba's national hero and a man idealized by both the exiles and by Castro supporters. For most of his speech, the eloquent and democratic-minded Figueres gave a stellar performance, combining fine oratory with wit. But then, toward the end of his speech, "Don Pepe" Figueres dropped his bombshell.

#### Seek a Dialogue

He said the Cuban exiles should seek a dialogue with Castro because there is no prospect of overthrowing him. And he offered himself as an intermediary.

"If I have to share with you actions which are not pleasurable but bitter, and mediate with Fidel, Russia or the devil, I am at your disposal," Figueres said to the stunned au-

#### Interpretation

dience. Such exile leaders as Jose Miró Cardona and Manuel Ray, who once were active in militant attempts to overthrow the Communist regime set up by Castro, were described as barely able to restrain themselves.

The surprise declaration by Figueres was greeted with almost total silence, although a few women reportedly cried at his words.

Figueres appeared to have second thoughts about what he had said later in the week when he arrived in Panama. Reporters asked him about reports that he had offered to be a mediator among the Cubans and Figueres replied evasively that he had said nothing specific.

"I am always at the disposal of the Cubans for whatever they please," he told Panamanian newsmen.

#### Close to Exiles

Asked if it was true that the militant exile organization Alpha 66 had rejected his offer, Figueres said he was not familiar with the organization.


Well-informed sources on Caribbean and Central American affairs say Figueres knows as much as any man about the Cuban exile movements and the men who lead them. After the Bay of Pigs disaster, some of the survivors of the invading force went to Costa Rica. Figueres himself, in his youth, was a leader of guerrilla forces fighting against such dictators as Ra-



fael Trujillo and Anastasio Somoza Garcia.

But Figueres also is known as a realistic man. When Costa Rica found itself with a huge coffee surplus, Figueres established diplomatic relations with Russia and sold his entire surplus to the Soviet Union.

His Marti dinner speech seems to mean that he has decided that, realistically, Castroism is here to stay and will have to be accepted. Only Figueres, however, would have chosen a Cuban exile conclave to state his new stand.

WASH STAR NEWS, 9 FEB 1973





RFB:BI

State-RD, Wash., D.C.  
October 1959

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PAGE 01

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SECRET 182225Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE [ ] 33713

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [ ]

WNINTEL REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 063636

1. THERE ARE NO [ ] STATION TRACES ON [ ]

WHO IS [ ]

CITIZEN, OR [ ]

RESIDENT WHO CONTACTED [ ]

2. [ ] ADDRESS [ ]

IS LEGITIMATE AND IS IN PROCESS OF BEING CHECKED BY STATION UNILATERAL ASSET. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

3. INDEX REF. FILE: 201-239298, 201-802841, 75-6-70/3. E2 IMPDET

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18 Jul 77

201-239298

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PAGE 1 OF 1

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076517

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INFO: FILE *BRAMS 90295010*

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*9PCS*

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Y

ATTENTION: INTD-CI/9 Y

CIR-316/02752-77 Y

SUBJECT:  Y

1. REFER TO FBI TELETYPE DATED 22 JUNE 1977, SUBJECT AS ABOVE. Y
2. THIS AGENCY HAS REVIEWED THE  FILE BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTING BEYOND JULY 1974, INCLUDING TRAVEL. WE HAVE QUERIED OUR REPRESENTATIVES  CONCERNING YOUR REQUEST WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS. Y
3. OUR REPRESENTATIVE  STATED THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM,  HAD BEEN IN BUSINESS  UNTIL DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT HE FREQUENTLY TRAVELLED IN AND OUT OF THE COUNTRY ("SHUTTLING" WAS TERM USED). IN DECEMBER 1976  WAS DECLARED "PERSONA NON GRATA" ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER  WHO BASED HIS DECISION ON VAGUE ALLEGATIONS THAT  HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN  EXILE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE NO TRACES ON   Y
4. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE  THERE ARE NO

DATE:  
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EXT:


*316/02752-77*  
*5 Aug 77*  
*201-237298*

CLASSIFICATION *SECRET*

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE


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STAFF

DIRECTOR CIA

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TRACES ON [ ] OR [ ] WHO CON-

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ADDRESS *THERE ARE ALSO BRANCH OFFICES* [ ]  
AND [ ]

5. YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION MADE AVAIL-  
ABLE TO THIS AGENCY. ♡

6. FYI: ABOVE INFO <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ OBTAINED PURSUANT TO CIA'S RESPONSIB-  
ILITY FOR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE  
THE U.S. ♡

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802841.

LA COMMENT: REF REQUESTED INFO ON [ ] TRAVEL AND CONTACTS AND, IF  
POSSIBLE, DETERMINE STATUS OF HIS VISA WORK PERMIT.

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DIRECTOR C-1

CONF: INFO: FILE

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ORIG: LA/COG/CI [ ] X1325}; COORD: C/LA/CSG [ ]

C/LA/CAR [ ] /LA/P&NC [ ] C/LA/OPS [ ] AUTH:

C/LA [ ] REL: A C/PCS/LSN [ ] J.P

DATE: 3 AUGUST 1977

ORIG: [ ]

UNIT: LA/COG/CI

EXT: 1325

[ ]

C/PCS/LSN

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SECRET 182205Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE [ ] 33713

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [ ]

WNINTEL REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 263636

1. THERE ARE NO [ ] STATION TRACES ON [ ]

[ ] WHO IS [ ]

CITIZEN, OR [ ]

RESIDENT WHO CONTACTED [ ] IN [ ]

2. [ ] ADDRESS IN [ ]

[ ]

IS LEGITIMATE AND IS IN PROCESS OF BEING CHECKED BY STATION UNILATERAL ASSET. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

3. INDEX REF. FILE: 201-239298, 201-802841, 75-6-70/3. E2 IMPDET

201-239298

SECRET

1. C/COG	
2. DC/COG	
3. COG/OPS	
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CABLE REC'D ASSEMBLY

1 Jul 77

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PAGE 01

TO: 222022 JUL 77

1. O/CEG

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SECRET 221946Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE: [redacted] 22711 [redacted]

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [redacted]

WVINTEL REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 063636

1. THERE ARE NO [redacted] STATION TRACES ON [redacted]

[redacted]

2. THROUGH ELICITATION RUAGSE-13 (R-13) DETERMINED THAT RUAGSE-7 HOLDS A FILE ON [redacted] BUT HE WAS UNABLE OBTAIN FILE. R-13 WAS TOLD THAT [redacted] HAD BEEN IN BUSINESS IN [redacted] UNTIL DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT HE FREQUENTLY TRAVELED IN AND OUT OF THE COUNTRY ("SHUTTLING" WAS TERM USED). IN DECEMBER 1976 [redacted] WAS DECLARED "PERSONAL NON GRATA" ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER [redacted] WHO BASED HIS DECISION ON VAGUE ALLEGATIONS THAT [redacted] HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN [redacted] EXILE ACTIVITIES.

3. FILE: 201-239298, 201-602941. E2 IMPDET.

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1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FBI CABLE #20220Z DATED 22 JUNE 1977:V  
[SIG CENTER: PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED FBI CABLE (IN ENGLISH) BEGINNING  
UNIT: [Redacted]

2. HQS HAS REVIEWED [Redacted] FILE BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTING BEYOND  
JULY 1974, INCLUDING TRAVEL. ADDRES ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE  
RECENT INFO AS PER FBI CABLE IF AVAILABLE WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED  
DISCRETELY

3. FYI: ABOVE INFO CAN BE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO CIA'S RE-  
SPONSIBILITY FOR ~~COUNTERINTELLIGENCE~~ <sup>ACQUISITION OF THE U.S.</sup> ~~INTELLIGENCE~~ <sup>INTELLIGENCE</sup>

4. FILE: 201-239298; 201-88241. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: FBI CABLE ATTACHED WHICH ASKED FOR INFO ON [Redacted] FOREIGN  
TRAVEL, CONTACTS AND REVOCATION / REISSUE OF [Redacted] WORK PERMIT.

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[Redacted] C/LA/PNC [Redacted] C/PCS/LSH [Redacted] 3;


AGC/DDO [Redacted] 3; AUTH: C/LA/COG [Redacted] 3; REL: AC/LA

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DATE: 5 JULY 1977  
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
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


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FBI cable  
22 June 77  
Re:



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PAGE 01

IN 352631

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SECRET 221946Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE [ ] 22711 [ ]

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [ ]

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
REF: DIRECTOR 063636

1. THERE ARE NO [ ] STATION TRACES ON [ ]

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2. THROUGH ELICITATION RUA98E-13 (R-13) DETERMINED THAT RUA98E-7 HOLDS A FILE ON RAY BUT HE WAS UNABLE OBTAIN FILE. R-13 WAS TOLD THAT [ ] HAD BEEN IN BUSINESS IN [ ] UNTIL DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT HE FREQUENTLY TRAVELED IN AND OUT OF THE COUNTRY ("SHUTTLING" WAS TERM USED). IN DECEMBER 1976 [ ] WAS DECLARED "PERSONAL NON GRATA" ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER [ ] WHO BASED HIS DECISION ON VAGUE ALLEGATIONS THAT [ ] HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN [ ] EXILE ACTIVITIES.

3. FILE: 201-239298, 201-602841. E2 IMPDET.



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201-SC2P41

22 Jul 77

201-239298

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

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
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SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 239298

FBI  
28 Feb 73  
From-   
Re



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SECRET 071431Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE [redacted] 18059

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH [redacted]

TYPIC RUABBE

REF: WH [redacted] 16450, 23 OCT 72 (w 767249)

1. RUABBE PASSED FOLL INFO RE SUBJ REF: 201-239292

[redacted]  
 [redacted] IN 63 [redacted] REPORTED LEADER  
 PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] HE DEPARTED FOR SAN JUAN ON 26 JAN 73  
 [redacted] HE TRAVELED  
 ON [redacted]

2. FILE: 103-9-1-7. INDEX: [redacted] E2 IMPDET

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 MAR 16 1973  
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7 Feb 73  
 201-239095

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION


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DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)




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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 239298

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SOURCE INFORMATION			EVALUATION	
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.			
TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)				
				
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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)		201- 239298		

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GROUP 1  
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(7-66)



Dept. of State Telegram  
28 Nov 72

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Dept. of State Telegram  
24 Nov 72

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Dept. of State Telegram  
22 Nov '72

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
Indicate The Subject, Project Or  
201 File No. In Which This  
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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 239298

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

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SECRET

119  
FEB 9 1971

**TO :** Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Attention: Domestic Intelligence Division

**FROM :** Deputy Director for Plans

**SUBJECT:** [redacted]

1. Reference is made to your request dated 18 December 1970, Subject as above and to your [redacted] report dated 10 December 1970, **BASE** Subject, which reported information received by [redacted] from a contact [redacted]

2. A review of this Agency's file on [redacted] has failed to show any current operational interest in this.

CSCI-316/00280-71

DDP/WH/COG/OPS, [redacted]

3 February 1971

**Distribution:**  
Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - RID  
1 - CI/R&A  
1 - CI/LIA  
1 - WH/COG/OPS  
1 - Originator

**BASED ON:** DED-00938, 18 Dec 70  
DBD-00739, 10 Dec 70

**FILE :** 201-864573  
Xref 201-239298

201-239298

FBI  
25 Feb 69  
From   
Subj - JURE



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INFO DIRECTOR,

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1. MOST RECENT INFO OUR FILES ON ACTIVITIES

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BY

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
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PAGE 2 WH [ ] 2233 S E C R E T



4. . ATTEMPTING OBTAIN INFO [ ] CURRENT ACTIVITIES. WILL  
ADVISE IF RESULTS POSITIVE. [ ] THIS U.S. CITIZEN. NOW.

5. FILE: 201-239298.

S E C R E T

SECRET

R10

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL SECRET		
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EA/DDP	29 Jan	[Signature]
2			
3	C/WH/COG		
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
<b>Remarks:</b> to 3: [Redacted] What is the status now of checking the record re Rodia connections with Heads? S-I P.Y.I. [Redacted] 29 Jan 69			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
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[Redacted] 1948			22 Jan 69
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FORM NO. 1-67

237

Use previous editions

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
*Pass*  
21 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/AM/COG

SUBJECT : Donn MUNSON, author of SAGA article, and  
Juan ERQUIAGA, Subject of Article.

1. Donn Hale MUNSON, born 1905, resident of Los Angeles, approached LICOMET/1 in 1964 claiming he represented a large group of Cuban exiles in the Los Angeles area. MUNSON asked LICOMET/1 about the location of training camps, etc. LICOMET/1 reported the discussion to Station Mexico City and was instructed to avoid MUNSON. Donn Hale MUNSON is probably identical with the Donn MUNSON who authored the Saga article. There are no additional identifiable traces on MUNSON.

2. There are numerous traces on Juan ERQUIAGA Aizcorbe, the owner of the weapons plant named in the Saga article. The FBI also reported ERQUIAGA was involved in the sale of arms to Cuban revolutionaries in 1965. Although FI was unable to locate the report, it was classified to Manolo RAY's 201 file. This would tend to support the Saga claim that any weapons supplied by ERQUIAGA's firm went to the JURE crowd, not to any Agency supported group.



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
TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		16 January 1969
TO: Chief, WH/COG		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
Per telephone conversation of last evening.		
FROM: EA/DDP		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-B  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(87)

# CIA -



## GUN MERCHANTS TO AMERICA'S HATE GROUPS

By Donn Munson



CIA-approved Arizona factory sold 45-cal. "Spitfire" machine guns as sporting weapons to Cuban exiles (photo), paramilitary "home defense" groups, and black nationalists... until IRS crack-down.

Intelligence Agency was secretly subsidizing the manufacture of thousands of machine guns which were being snapped up by some of the worst extremists in the U.S. today!

Last year, Attorney General Thomas Lynch of California ordered a raid on a secret machine gun plant in City of Industry (a suburb of L.A.), which did not have state permission for the manufacture, possession, sale or transportation of such weapons—but was churning them out illegally with the blessings of the CIA!

Of all the dangerous elements that exist in our society today, the most subversive would have to be any organization found arming the extremist elements—of either side—with modern weapons for possible civil war.

In this light, brought to the public's attention for the first time anywhere, is SAGA's *Accusals*. The CIA is responsible for arming far-out extremist groups in their preparation for civil conflict which could ultimately produce chaos in America. The CIA has, indeed, been covertly bankrolling the manufacture of thousands of revolutionary automatic weapons in secret plants under the very noses of high state and city officials.

While the Administration, Congress and various law-enforcement groups have worked for years for some sort of gun-control legislation, the shocking truth is that the Central

Continued

Further, the U.S. military has been an unwitting source of arms to these same elements which, together with CIA-supplied arms constitutes one of the gravest threats to the country today. . . .

The shabby building at 15036 E. Proctor Ave. in the City of Industry (a Los Angeles suburb) looks like any of a score of other small manufacturing plants in the area. It could turn out lamp shades, dog collars, aluminum awnings, or mop handles. Maybe it has at some time. But for years it was one of several factories where a mysterious Peruvian named Juan Erquiaga, a 50-ish beetle-browed gun genius, churned out machine guns illegally . . . with the blessings of the CIA!

The Erquiaga Arms Company sought anonymity and got it for years. It was organized and designed so skillfully owners of neighboring plants did not know what was being made next door. "Paint, I think," guessed one neighbor.

But behind the exterior of normalcy and calm there was furious activity. Machine gun parts were stamped and tooled. Ammunition clips were shaped and welded. Barrels were chambered and stocks were fitted.

Every employe of the plant was a guard. There was a loaded gun behind every door, under every lath, always near at hand. And over this busy, deadly business presided Juan Erquiaga, a major league merchant of death whose goods were for sale to the highest bidder. Or to whoever the CIA said "Sell!"

Born in Lima, Peru, he studied at the *Escuela Militar* (military school) there and from 1940 to 1944 according to police records served in the U.S. Army as a second lieutenant. Returning to Peru, he was graduated from the *Politecnico Principal del Peru* as a tool designer. But after having tasted life in the U.S. and realizing he could ply his trade more rewardingly here, he came back to the States and became a naturalized citizen in 1956.

A genius with guns, he had trouble with language. "I spent many hours learning English so I could communicate my ideas to others," he once recalled.

And he had ideas, plenty of them . . . and all of them lethal. Even before he came to the U.S., Erquiaga invented many types of weapons. Once here as a citizen, he put his fearsome talent to work by opening a firearms manufacturing shop in South Gate, another Los Angeles suburb.

Military rifles were his specialty . . . modifications of old guns that under his magic touch could fire faster and deadlier than their inventors had ever dreamed. Eager customers from South and Central America, where the winds of revolution blow constant and hot, competed with homegrown kook organizations, such as the Minutemen and California Rangers for his products.

Two years later, Erquiaga smelled bigger game. Fidel Castro was on the rise in Cuba and he needed men like Juan Erquiaga. Fidel waved money under Erquiaga's bulbous nose and the Peruvian reacted like a starving tiger smelling fresh meat.

Castro gave him some cash and lots of rank. He made Erquiaga commander of his ordnance department. When the Cuban Communist swept dictator Batista out of power and into exile, Erquiaga stayed on. Fidel promised him new glory and he delivered, making Juan a minister of public works. Erquiaga was riding high with the rebels. But then—in 1960—he found it expedient to flee Cuba.

"I do not like to talk about those days. I . . . were betrayed," he said later. What betrayed him was a love not for freedom but for money. The big loot was not in Latin America but in southern California, where blazing sunshine fails to illuminate many dark plots and counterplots. Erquiaga came back to the Golden State via Mexico, where he took a brief fling at making machine guns for anti-Castro forces. He never had any political convictions cash couldn't change.

By 1962 Erquiaga was back in the big league, this time in El Monte, not far from the scene of his earlier success as an arms maker for the malcontents. Once again he was turning out fast-firing rifles. But within three months he was into something deeper and deadlier.

In the City of Industry plant, he was grinding out 20,000 machine guns. And what guns! Feather light (six pounds loaded) and of his own design, the Erquiaga weapons are chambered for 9 mm parabolium ammo, carry 32 rounds and fire 1,500 rounds per minute. They combine full and selective automatic firing. The action is inertia, or "blowback."

Judd Smith, a California journalist and small arms expert, says they out-perform existing U.S. military submachine guns both in terms of rate of fire and accuracy in short and prolonged bursts.

"The most notable feature of them is that the muzzle doesn't climb uncontrollably during sustained bursts, permitting amazing accuracy," Smith says.

Erquiaga proudly pointed out that the muzzle is prevented from climbing by a special device of his own design affixed to it. "Other similar devices have been designed by the U.S. Army, but none has ever proved as effective as this," he boasted with some justification.

Juan Erquiaga had a good thing going for him and he knew just how to keep it rolling . . . deep underground. Business was great. Even if Juan did not have the right permits hanging on his factory wall, he had something better—several things, in fact.

One was a contract for 500 machine guns signed by Manuel Roy, leader of *Junta Revolucionaria Aeria Cubana* (JURA), an anti-Castro outfit then trying to oust Fidel, with the CIA picking up the tab.

A prominent Cuban exile now living in Los Angeles boasts that he personally delivered \$50,000 advance cash to Erquiaga as part of \$250,000 put up by the CIA. The 500 machine guns were to be the first of thousands.

"I was working for the CIA," the exile brags. "I made the payoff. No, I'm not certain where the guns were supposed to go. But I was hoping they were scheduled for anybody fighting Fidel."

Continued

... unexpectedly, after years of full blast operation, the roof suddenly fell in on Juan Erquiaga. By now, he was a flush businessman with a wife and 10 children living at 230 Chatterton Ave. in the comfortable L.A. suburb of La Puente. Once again Juan Erquiaga blew the whole setup because next to his love for guns came his love for money.

Not satisfied with his CIA payoffs, he tried to pick up some extra cash on the side. Reliable sources say his wonder guns began to end up in some peculiar hands. At the same time, he began to modify M-16 rifles into full automatics for the Extremist National States Rights Party, a particularly vicious anti-Negro, anti-Jewish guerrilla gang which has its headquarters in Birmingham, Ala. It requires its members

to wear white shirts, black ties, black Sam Browne belts, black trousers, and an armband emblazoned with a thunderbolt insignia.

As recently as Sept. 1, 1963, the white supremacy outfit waged a gun battle against Negroes in Berea, Ky., leaving two dead, several injured, and 13 charged with murder.

The States Rights Party had a large following in California, some of whom had big mouths and whose bragging fell on the ears of an alert but anonymous local police officer. He promptly turned in a report on Erquiaga's activities and it came to the attention of Attorney General Thomas Lynch.

Attorney General Lynch, who later engineered legislation outlawing private armies in California, ordered a raid. Los Angeles county and state (plus federal) officers swooped down on the Erquiaga plant, armed with a search warrant signed by Judge Fred W. Raab and issued to Deputy District Attorney Maurice Oppenheimer.

It was a big raid which netted only little fish—the big one got away.

Sheriff's deputies grabbed 373 automatic weapons (which they still have as evidence), and 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Erquiaga's wife said he was in Panama. Police said he had hightailed it for Guatemala, where machine guns are very much in demand and where assassination has claimed 4,000 lives (including the U.S. Ambassador and two U.S. military attaches stationed there). It is possible Erquiaga, Castro's on-again, off-again employee, may have found work there in the current guerrilla war being waged against the government.

However, Erquiaga, still wanted in Los Angeles, has never been seen since in the States. His disappearance opened some startling revelations. Among them, these—

A possibility that President Lyndon Johnson personally knew about the plant and its operation. A former aide who lives in Pico Rivera, Calif. told a reporter he presented an Erquiaga Special to the President "as a favor to Juan."

Malcolm F. Warner, then supervisor of the L.A. Bureau of the Internal Revenue Service's Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, charged with enforcing the Federal Firearms Act, said he didn't have any knowledge of Erquiaga's wrongdoing. Juan, he said, had a federal permit.

True enough, admitted the sheriff's office, but Erquiaga did not have state authorization for the manufacture, possession, sale or transportation of such weapons.

Clearly, the CIA had slipped up.

Perhaps Erquiaga did not have local permits because he had a local record. Heatedly, it was revealed by the IRS that Juan had been arrested in Lynwood, Calif., for making machine guns without any kind of permit in 1953 and that for four years he had been a fugitive. He gave himself up, paid only a \$500 fine and was back in business until the big raid.

Lowell Knudson, another Erquiaga associate at the gun plant, was convicted of possession of illegal firearms and fined a mere \$100 and put on probation for three years by Pomona (Calif.) Superior Court Judge Howard McClain.

But that didn't end the Erquiaga case. At least two of his guns vanished to reportedly reappear in a secret San Fernando Valley cache to become the nucleus of still another illegal operation—this one run by the Minutemen.

Lloyd Pullen, of Long Beach, a 30-year-old one-time lieutenant of Minuteman National Commander Robert DePugh, revealed to this writer that the extremists were unable to buy enough automatic weapons in any single market, open or underground.

They were forced to go into manufacturing, Pullen said. The ex-Minuteman, who has now formed his own "home defense" unit with the backing of some John Birch Society members, declared he broke with DePugh because the national commander "was too konky, a real Nazi bastard." Pullen had no connection with the runs.

The underground gun-making remained secret for some time. Then, early in 1963, DePugh and some of his cohorts allegedly attempted to hold up a bank in the Northwest as "part of a guerrilla warfare training exercise."

He was indicted Feb. 20, 1963, by a grand jury at Seattle, Wash., on a charge of conspiracy to commit bank robbery. The U.S. Attorney at Seattle won the indictment but now refuses to reveal details of the case, refusing to answer written or telephone requests for particulars. Why he shrouds the case in mystery at this point cannot be determined.

DePugh is now wanted by the FBI and is the object of an international manhunt. Presumably, he fled the U.S. by way of Canada, a la James Earl Ray. But he has communicated with newsmen. He sent a letter, saying in part:

"We are fugitives, not because we made machine guns, or robbed banks, or kidnapped little girls. We are fugitives because we openly opposed traitors in our own government. We are not criminals—we are political refugees."

He is going to have a tough time convincing a jury of that when he is caught; for he has a long record and has led a rough guerrilla outfit not noted for its bravery. In 1960, a Minuteman testified during a trial on a firearms count that DePugh's men once discussed assassinating Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a scheme to put cyanide gas in the air-conditioning ducts at the United Nations building in New York.

Continued



...of them in four years for possession and illegal possession of automatic weapons.

Though the Minutemen are now deeper underground than ever, they occasionally break out or will. At Voluntown, Conn., on Aug. 24, 1968, six men described by the FBI as "secret, extremist and anti-Communist" shot it out with Connecticut state police in a pre-dawn raid on an encampment of pacifists.

Masked and armed, the Minutemen broke into a training camp. They wore old Army fatigues and carried bayonet-tipped rifles. FBI men had alerted the state troopers and both were waiting for the attack.

"When the Minutemen were spotted," said State Police Commissioner Leo J. Mulcahy, "we identified ourselves and the firing began."

Six persons (four raiders, one state trooper and a woman resident of the camp) were wounded, none fatally.

The fact the raiders carried only bayonet-tipped rifles indicates they are low on the totem pole when it comes to being combat-equipped. Because subversives are experiencing no trouble in getting automatic weapons straight from CIA factories and, indeed, from Uncle Sam's arsenals.

Shortly before Christmas last year (1967), Marine Corps officers at Camp Pendleton, Calif., discovered that 15 M-79 grenade launchers, each capable of destroying tanks and armored cars, had vanished from the military post. It was a serious, though not highly unusual, theft. In the hands of extremists, they could be devastating.

Word was flashed to the FBI, the National Guard, the CIA, Naval Intelligence, and police units the length and breadth of the country. The 15 grenade launchers joined an alarming list of guns and ammunition currently being stolen on an almost continual basis from military installations all over the United States.

The reaction of Lt. Col. G. W. Ferguson, spokesman for the Marines at Camp Pendleton, was almost one of resignation. "There are 43,000 Marines, plus special units of the Navy and Army, in training here," he said. "We cannot search each and every one of them each time he goes out of the gates. Weapons and ammunition can be stolen anytime some guy decides to walk off with them and go over the hill."

Each week a long list of stolen arms is circulated to police and military intelligence officials who are no longer surprised to see on it such items as the grenade launchers, or even machine guns. These losses are rarely made public.

Nor is news of their recovery—in any—broadcast. In fact, police and the military go to extraordinary, and sometimes ridiculous lengths to cover them up.

While Lt. Col. Ferguson admitted the 15 M-79s had vanished, the civilian police who recovered them denied they were ever stolen.

Lt. Col. Ferguson declared that credit for their recovery should go either to the Santa Ana Police Department or to the Orange County Sheriff's Office; he

couldn't be sure which. The M-79s, and the Marine officers, were captured less than 10 days after the M-79s were taken and returned to the USMC. But official spokesmen for both civilian police departments, one of whom was in charge of his unit when the case broke, denied any knowledge of the affair.

"If any Marine weapons were stolen, that would be a federal case," one high ranking civilian cop said blandly. Pressed for details, he inculpated the whole matter was now FBI-controlled and refused to discuss it further.

Not all thefts from the military are state-wide. Recently, the Post Office Department in San Francisco, through which most Vietnam mail passes, announced that it had spot-checked packages being shipped home from the war zone. What postal inspectors found shocked them to the core. . . . M-16 rifles, grenades, live ammunition, even light, dismantled machine guns! They did not reveal the names of the senders or the potential receivers. They did not even report what means they were taking to prevent future shipments.

In fact, the cloak of secrecy which surrounds illegal weapons activities is being drawn tighter and tighter, sometimes with embarrassing results.

This past summer, as the nation braced itself for an outbreak of civil violence and a possible race war, Los Angeles Police Chief Thomas Reddin told a press conference he had definite information that well-armed guerrilla groups existed in his city.

Los Angeles, still shaking from frequent shoot-outs in Watts and the assassination of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, reacted nervously to the news. So did Chief Reddin and sources above him.

Before the day was out, he called two other news conferences—the second to explain what he meant by the first announcement, and the third to deny his original statement. At least one Los Angeles radio station broadcast all three of the chief's statements consecutively. It made highly interesting, if confusing, listening and left people wondering who had slipped Reddin the word.

When Watts did explode with another gun battle not long afterward, it left Angelenos more confused than ever. Three civilians were slain and 41 persons, including six cops, were wounded. But a news blackout was imposed. "Who shot whom and with what?" demanded *The Los Angeles Times*, a newspaper with nearly 1,000,000 daily circulation.

One of the less confused persons in Los Angeles was Celes King III, head of the L.A. Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

A calm, collected moderate leader of the black community, highly respected in all civic circles, King declared L.A. had a right to not only be confused but to be scared. The city, he said, was then, and is now, in a "touch and go" situation. "It could explode any minute," he said.

"There are more guns here than in Saigon," he said flatly.

King added he was considering only registered guns. The number of unregistered weapons, including fully automatic firearms, was beyond his speculation.

Many a case, he believes, . . . from an active operation with four routes between Arizona, Nevada and California. In the two previous states they are easier to obtain than in California. Hand-guns are bought cheap there, run into California in car and plane by both white and black gunrunners, and then sold at tremendous profit to buyers who want to avoid a five-day waiting period and a police investigation.

Until May 1968, it was possible to buy a fully automatic machine gun without receiving it in accordance with federal law.

Thanks to Uncle Sam's generosity, it was possible for subversive groups and individuals to purchase them over the counter for as little as \$99.

Thousands of them are now secretly owned by individuals and groups all through the United States, the IRS admits, as it fancies deals for the owners to come into government offices and pay a \$500 fee to register each one. Few have done so, as IRS spokesman admits, recalling sadly, "I think there was one fellow. He said he wanted it for a wall decoration. Anyway, he paid the \$200."

The story behind their manufacture and sale is both fascinating and shocking, many of the details still hidden by embarrassed government officials.

It began in Phoenix, Ariz., where on a quiet street in a nondescript building a small organization called the Spitfire Manufacturing Company set up shop some time ago. Its purpose was to make and sell a featherweight, .45 caliber carbine as a "secretive weapon."

At \$85 each retail, they were something of a sensation among certain "sportsmen." Anti-Castro Cuban groups, planning on heading the same on their native ice, snapped them up. After all, there's no law against non-citizen Cubans owning sporting guns.

So groups like the recently reborn Bay of Pigs Brigade and *Radio Cubano* hurried to their local gun-shops and stocked up. Then many of them took to the mountains and deserts to practice hunting maneuvers which, strangely enough, included ambushes, patrolling, scouting, and wild charges which are not ordinarily associated with California jackrabbits and coyotes. Such critics stood in little danger because the Cubans sometimes accidentally used each other as targets.

Minutemen, black nationalists, and paramilitary "home defense" troops eagerly bought the lethal little Spitfires. And all because they, like the Cubans, knew something it took Uncle Sam many months to learn.

The "sportsmen" learned that what one branch of the government considered a simple carbine, but which actually resembles a sub-machine gun, could be made fully automatic merely by depressing the safety lever at the same time the trigger was pulled.

"That thing," said a disgusted IRS man charged with enforcing the law against illegal machine guns, "doesn't bear the slightest resemblance to a sporting gun."

Then, recognizing his identity be protected, the IRS man disclosed that:

"As I get in the company that made them was fully aware of their automatic

capability. In fact, I'm told nominally that the company was set up financially by the House Small Business Administration loans section in Washington. The guns were never supposed to be put on public sale. Something got loused up."

The IRS man said "another agency had asked that the company be established. It was concluded he was referring obliquely to the CIA. If so, it duplicates to some degree the Requiza case."

The operation was brought to a screeching halt July 7, 1968, when the IRS ordered the registration of the Spiffers. The plant itself was reportedly shut down in May. IRS sources said "some arrests" had been made but because a trial is pending no more information would be made public. When this writer attempted to learn further details, he received unsolicited long distance telephone calls from IRS headquarters in Washington and California demanding to know "why" he was gathering facts.

A recent 101-page report on "Firearms, Violence and Civil Disorders," prepared by Arnold Kote of the Stanford Research Institute for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, does not concern itself with machine guns or other fully automatic weapons.

The report cost its sponsors—two of the nation's largest firearms manufacturers, Winchester and Remington—\$35,000. It concludes that "guns have not played a major role in America's urban riots to date, but exaggerated press reports of rioters using guns have apparently frightened many citizens into arming themselves for future disorders."

This report may be correct with regard to the frightened citizens (though there is no concrete evidence), but is inaccurate on the subject of urban riots. The Stanford Research Institute study, which is addressed to the White House as the word on firearms, violence and civil disorder, is convinced that reports about civilians using firearms (not to mention machine guns) during urban riots is pretty much hokum.

It will be very difficult to convince Cleveland, Ohio, Police Chief Michael Blackwell of that.

He told Mayor Carl Stokes on July 30, 1968, that if the mayor had not ordered white policemen out of the violence-torn eastside area of the city earlier in the month that the officers "would have walked into a slaughter."

Chief Blackwell said there was evidence that black nationalists who ambushed police, touching off a savage gun battle that killed 10 persons, had "tripod military type machine guns" and would have used them had the white officers not been withdrawn.

The chief declared that police informants saw at least one machine gun and that the black nationalists had stitched ammunition belts which would have been useless in any other type of weapon.

"They (Cleveland officers) should thank their lucky stars they were pulled out. There were machine guns up there waiting for them," Chief Blackwell said. Then he declined to amplify the disclosure. Once again the curtain was drawn around the subject of machine guns and a news blackout was on.

However, Chief Blackwell did say that he didn't know where the machine guns are now. Nonetheless, his own intelligence unit retrieved 15 high-powered weapons, including one machine gun, from the charred ruins of an apartment house in which a black nationalist died in the gun battle, according to an Associated Press report from the embattled city.

Where might these lethal, high-powered weapons have been obtained? They could have been bought from the CIA's underground factories, or they could have been stolen from the military, or they could have even been purchased from the Army, indirectly. According to the Stanford Research Institute's report, the U.S. Army has indeed been duped by extremist groups in the past into indiscriminate selling of weapons.

Admitting deep concern over the proliferation of paramilitary organizations, the Stanford report says the Civilian Marksmanship Program administered by the Secretary of the Army in conjunction with the National Rifle Association sold excess military firearms and ammunition at reduced prices to not only the all-white Minutemen but in 1967 to a group called RAM (Revolutionary Action Movement). RAM is the parent organization of UHURU, the Afro-American Youth Association, Afro-Student Association and the Black Panther Party. RAM is aligned with the Communist Viet Cong under leadership of the notorious Robert Williams, a fugitive American now in Peking, China.

The House Committee on Un-American Activities considers RAM one of the most dangerous radical groups in America.

The purchases of these military arms were made by subversives of every stripe who formed phony gun clubs which then joined the NRA (which has since repudiated them and set up a careful screening process).

Lamentably, the five-month, \$35,000 study concludes also that "there is no information as to who is buying firearms by age group, sex or race, or the declared motivation for purchase . . ." The report also says "adequate information is also not available as to the number of guns stolen or transferred annually, the number of guns in the inventory of individual possession in each state or city, or the number of guns currently being sold to residents of each state or city."

The Stanford Research Institute "estimate" is that individuals possess at least 115 million firearms—maybe as many as 200 million, or one for every man, woman and child in the U.S. Considering the number the Stanford Research Institute does not know about, as for example military invents, there's no doubt about it.

If motivation for buying weapons is a mystery to Stanford's learned scientists, they might do well to consult some of the 115-to-200 million owners. Today, in an America rent by turmoil and conflict, where there is at least one gun for every man, woman and child, there is great fear that extremist activity will precipitate a virtual civil war. And if the extremists

start shooting for keeps, they will do so with sophisticated weapons sold to them by the CIA factories that may still be going today, or with modern weapons supplied by an unwitting military establishment.

Little wonder, then, that so many people feel uneasy about the gun situation today. They've been reading about RAM and they've been reading about the Minutemen . . . and wondering what other extremist groups are stockpiling weapons, just waiting for their day . . .

\* THE END

FBI  
12 Dec 63

From

Re

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		7. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	8. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
4. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DETERMINED IN	11. DATE	

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CURR CARD      R 7001200354

FILE IN 201-239298

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➤


FBI

1 Feb 61

Re: Movimiento Revolucionario  
del Pueblo (MRP)

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

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5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
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WH/C 67-322

21 OCT 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security  
Chief, Operational Support Division

ATTENTION

SUBJECT

Cancellation of Proposed Travel

REFERENCE : WH/COG #67-312, 6 October 1967

1. In the reference it was requested that a welcoming officer meet [redacted] on their arrival at Kennedy Airport from Lisbon on 9 November 1967.

2. [redacted] telephoned [redacted] WH/COG/CICS [redacted] on 19 October 1967 to say that his European trip has been cancelled.

3. Your cooperation in this case has been appreciated.

[redacted]  
RC/WH/COG

DDP/WH/COG/CICS [redacted] 20 October 1967

Distribution:

Orig & 1-Addressee

1-WH/Reg/C

1-C/WH/COG

1-WH/COG/CICS

1-201-239298

1-201-062084

1-Originator

SECRET



201-239298

[Redacted]

SECRET

PFTR:

19 October 1967

Subject: AMBASSOR/1

1/The Subject called me on the sterile phone at approximately 1500 hours this date to report that he had just received word that his mother [Redacted] was dying of glaucoma. He had had to cancel his trip to Europe (CS has already been notified to cancel the VIP reception in New York that we had planned for the Subject)x and instead was coming to the US to consult with his sister [Redacted]

2. He will be arriving at Dilles International Airport at 1210 hours on/ PAA 280.(This is a flight that leaves [Redacted] at 0830 hours the same date). I told him that I would meet him and that we could have lunch together with [Redacted] (Subsequent check with [Redacted] approved this appointment).

3. The Subject will leave right after lunch [Redacted] by rented car or by bus. When he returns [Redacted] sometime around 24 of 25 October 1967) he will stay overnight ~~with [Redacted]~~ with [Redacted]

Noted indraft:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

2-01-239298



SECRET

WH/COG 0 67-312

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security  
Chief Operational Support Division

ATTENTION :  
SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

1. On 9 November 1967 [Redacted] who are both Cuban [Redacted] will be returning to the United States [Redacted] on Pan American Airways (PAA) Flight [Redacted] arriving Kennedy Airport [Redacted]

2. [Redacted] has been a most valuable contact of this Agency for a number of years [Redacted]

[Redacted]

4. [Redacted] plan to rent a car and go from New York [Redacted] to visit his sister there.

5. It is requested that [Redacted] be met at Kennedy Airport by a welcoming officer, and that they be given all possible help to facilitate their going through customs, I & NS, etc. Every possible courtesy should be extended them.

6. [Redacted] knows both [Redacted] of WH/COG by their true names. Their names may be used as bona fides by the welcoming officer.

[Redacted]

C/WH/COG

DDP/WH/COG/CICS [Redacted]


DISTRIBUTION:

Orig and 1 - Addressee  
1 - WH/REG/C  
1 - WH/COG/CICS

1 - 201-239298  
1 - 201-062084  
1 - Originator

SECRET

201-239298




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201-61127

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4811  
201-61127



201-239291  
19-300-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMAVE

Yellow filed in Branch - 201-239298  
White filed in Branch - 19-300-4

ACTION: C/SAS 3

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, ODP, RI/AN DUMMY, VR


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
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JUL 14 1967  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19-300-4


201-239298  
4 Feb 64

Envelope



*last ca  
4/29/67*

Dear



I am writing to ask you to do me a special favor. As you probably already know, Expo 67 and the Fifth Pan-American Games are being held this year at Montreal and Winnipeg respectively in celebration of Canada's centennial as a confederation. I have heard some of the [redacted] exiles are planning some actions against the [redacted] delegations to these events, and I am interested in knowing anything that may come your way regarding this.

I hope you are well and am looking forward to hearing from you in the near future should I have the opportunity to visit [redacted]

In the meantime [redacted] joins me in sending best wishes to you.


Personal regards,



P.S.

Should anything of a priority nature come to your attention please let me [redacted] through [redacted]


Many thanks,



*File in  
701-239298*

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		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
6. ANALYST	5. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
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PERTINENT INFORMATION					
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UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DC/WH/COG

EXTENSION

NO

DATE

24 March 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/WH/COG

*[Handwritten initials]*

2.

WH/COG/EXO

31 *[Handwritten initials]*

3.

4.

*DC/COG*

*OK*

5.

C/WH/COG/CA

3 *APL*

*P2*

6.

C/WH/COG/FI

4/17 4/17

*[Handwritten initials]*

7.

*C/WH/3*

*[Handwritten initials]*

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

DC/WH/COG

*[Handwritten initials]*

13.

14.

15.

1 to 5: When  got back - *[Handwritten]* have been call  see if he is interested in time on WH/WH.

See para 3

~~4-5~~

4-5: See note from Tom, above. Should we? Would you?

4-5: *[Handwritten]* although not advised by this board, *[Handwritten]* with *[Handwritten]* he was told that *[Handwritten]* time was *[Handwritten]*.

*[Handwritten signature]*

FORM 2-62

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SECRET

LX-3248

24 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Operational Meetings [redacted]

1. [redacted] arrived in Washington, D.C., by air [redacted] on 20 March 1967 on a personal business trip. At the request of AMBADGER he phoned the writer and we met for approximately 1½ hours in the bar of the Hotel Ambassador in downtown Washington. This meeting was followed by a luncheon meeting on 21 March at the Occidental Restaurant. [redacted] returned [redacted] on 22 March. The following are the highlights of our conversations.

a. [redacted] claims he has "lost access" with ~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> the MIG pilot [redacted]

He no longer has any means of contacting him or of knowing his present whereabouts or attitude.

b. He claimed he does not have any direct communication--or access--to any significant military or government officials

[redacted]

d. Although he maintains contact with active members of his "movement" they have no present or projected plans for "action" except in the propaganda field.

e. His business in the prefabricated housing field is progressing satisfactorily. He has obtained private financing to start a prefab plant [redacted] and recently visited [redacted] where the prospects are good.

2. Future Plans:

a. [redacted] mentioned that his organization plans to send a representative [redacted] before the end of March [redacted]

Ray is

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201-234298



anxious to do everything possible to assist [redacted] in obtaining his freedom but admitted he had no commo or means of making contact with him in prison.



3. [redacted] mentioned that he thought someone should utilize [redacted] who now lives and works on a newspaper [redacted] in propaganda activity [redacted]

4. He did not ask or hint for any financial assistance for his organization.

5. We discussed briefly the Olympic Games to be held in Winnipeg, Canada, this summer. AMBADGER had asked him to bring up the subject. I told him in essence that we were not interested in inducing the defection of any athletes [redacted]

6. In general [redacted] was as usual pleasant, friendly and talkative. It is evident that he is now concentrating on earning a living for himself and his family. However, at the same time he maintains a keen interest in [redacted]

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
-3-

developments; hope to maintain somewhat of a name for himself and his organization in exile circles by a limited amount of propaganda activities and stands ready and willing to help in any major plans if and when they should ever materialize.


7. Regular contact will be maintained [redacted] by AMBADGER who [redacted] speaks highly of and is pleased with the handling arrangement.

[redacted]  
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

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201-239298



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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
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		2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	3. DATE
		4. SOURCE COUNTRY	5. DATE OF INFO
6. ANALYST	7. DATE PROCESSED	8. DISSEMINATED TO	9. DATE


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12. PERTINENT INFORMATION

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FILE IN 201-234298.

13. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.



17

SECRET

File No. 437 297

25 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meetings [redacted]  
13 and 15 October 1966

MIG-21--Defecting Pilot--et al.

1. In lengthy discussions on this point it developed that [redacted] has been unable to obtain any more pertinent information since he first called the matter to AMBADGER's attention almost two months ago. The basis of the "Mig Plot" is a tip he received from an inside contact which was brought to him by someone exiting Cuba. [redacted] considers the inside contact reliable but prefers not to identify him. [redacted] has not been able to determine if the inside contact is personally in contact, or can arrange contact, with the Mig Pilot who reportedly is fed up with the situation in Cuba and plans to defect with his airplane whenever he has an opportunity. The "tip" [redacted] received was to this effect i.e., that there is a Mig Pilot who is disenchanted and plans to defect with his plane. One point [redacted] was specific on was that the plane was described as "one of the smaller Migs" and according to [redacted] it is not a Mig-21.

2. After [redacted] original contacts with AMBADGER on this subject (wherein the plane was apparently erroneously identified as a MIG-21) [redacted] claims he sent a message to the inside contact requesting the complete details we had asked for. He has received no reply. In response to my request at the meeting on 13 October 1966 he told me at our subsequent meeting on 15 October that he attempted to reach his inside contact by phone but was unsuccessful. He was urged to continue until he reached the party and to obtain as much detail on this matter as possible so we could hopefully clarify the situation. He assured me he would follow-through on this and report to AMBADGER. (It seemed pretty obvious to me after two discussions with [redacted] on this subject that he has no direct means of reaching the original reporting source on the "Mig Plot" and consequently may never be able to verify the original "tip" and obtain further details.

3. In any event I outlined for him in general the U.S. Government interest in obtaining a modern version of the MIG-21 and the financial and other rewards available to a pilot who would bring one out. I emphasized that any activity along this line would have to be strictly [redacted] and the [redacted] operation and done through his contacts and sources reiterating again that therefore it was essential that he confirm the plane, model, pilot, etc. reported to him to determine if the operation was feasible.

4. We spent sometime discussing his "image" [redacted] [redacted] He agreed that at the present time it could hardly be lower and something rather dramatic was needed to improve it. We both agreed that if he could pull off a successful operation to defect a MIG-21 pilot with his plane it would do much to restore his and the [redacted] name and prestige.

5. Although [redacted] is obviously far removed from the action agent (the pilot), if such exists, the idea of the operation intrigues him and he will undoubtedly do everything he can to stimulate some action. Any further information developed by him will be forwarded to us through AMBADGER.

[redacted]

Deputy Chief, WH/Cuba

Distribution:  
Original - [redacted] 201  
1 - DC/WH/C

201-239 298

SECRET

Fi. No-237298

25 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. The following are the highlights of meetings held [REDACTED] on 13 and 15 October 1966. The matter of the possible defection of a MIG-pilot previously reported [REDACTED] has been covered in a separate memorandum:

Personal Situation:

a. [REDACTED] has an engineering and planning office [REDACTED] which he shares with [REDACTED] a personal friend and [REDACTED] colleague who is in the publicity business. [REDACTED] he just signed a contract for the planning of a commercial development site [REDACTED] from which he will realize several thousand dollars profit. His principal (and pet) project is the promotion and attempt to raise through private funds the financing of a plant to mass produce low-cost prefabricated housing designed by him. He claims with an investment of \$200,000 he can mass produce prefabricated homes to sell for \$3,000 which would be ideal [REDACTED]


Recent Trip [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] his recent trip [REDACTED] was strictly for business purposes. He hopes to start a small project [REDACTED] to produce prefabricated housing. The small project he has in mind can get underway with an expenditure of \$80,000, which he feels confident can be raised [REDACTED]. He said he naturally talked with some people in the government [REDACTED] but that the government must become stronger and more confident before there would be any possibility of obtaining their assistance--or blessing--in conducting any activities [REDACTED]

MIG-21, Defecting Pilot, et al.

c. This matter has been covered in a separate memorandum.

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201-237298



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
Internal Contacts.

d. One gets the impression that [redacted] lives somewhat removed from the actual realities of the [redacted] internal situation. He has a tendency to compare the internal situation today with that which existed [redacted] when he [redacted] was one of the leaders of the [redacted] underground resistance movement [redacted] maintains direct personal contact with many new arrivals seeking asylum [redacted] and also undoubtedly receives a certain amount of general information and gossip from other [redacted] contacts and supporters. He claims to have many friends and former associates inside, which is probably true, but does not have any regular or secure means to communicate with them. It appears obvious that these friends and contacts are not working together, if at all, and that he has no cohesive resistance group or force as such inside.

I questioned him about several personalities

[redacted]  
[redacted] He had no specific information at all on their activities in recent months but said he "could get it if you want it." In summary on this point, it would appear that [redacted] maintain no regular contact with any internal "supporters"; that he undoubtedly still has many former friends and supporters inside but just what they would do-- or how far they would go--to support him is a moot question.

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Financial Situation.

g. [ ] made no request for financial assistance and from all indications is doing fairly well in his local business.


2. [ ] plans to travel [ ] in early November for about two weeks and said he would visit [ ] representatives in several large cities, including D.C. He will be in touch

with AMBADGER who will be vacationing in the U.S. at that time and hopefully they will be able to get together with the writer while in D.C. In any event [redacted] obviously likes, respects and accepts AMBADGER as our go-between [redacted] and I believe he will keep AMBADGER posted on most of his activities.

3. [redacted] as exiles go, certainly seems like one of the better of the lot and contact on the scene by AMBADGER on a regular basis should be adequate to keep up with his activities. Occasional contact by an Agency staff officer, however, could be useful in keeping AMBADGER's relationship fully alive.



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5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE
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PERTINENT INFORMATION			
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		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
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7 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


File

SUBJECT: AMBADGER [redacted]

1. AMBADGER phoned this A.M. to tell me that he had met again [redacted] on the night of 3 September. He said [redacted] claimed he had passed the word to his inside ~~control~~ *contact* (who is either the MIG pilot or the man in contact with the MIG pilot) by telephone to tell the pilot to proceed with his defection plans. AMBADGER still does not know the name of the MIG pilot or any further details concerning [redacted] plans.
2. AMBADGER has another meeting scheduled [redacted] on 10 September at which time [redacted] has promised him biographic data on two of his alleged internal contacts which emerged (??) recently after [redacted] meeting [redacted]
3. [redacted] still plans a seminar for [redacted] supporters for early October, date as yet undetermined [redacted] supporters from Mexico, other Latin American countries, and the U.S. will be invited.
4. AMBADGER plans a two-week vacation in early October, but if [redacted] follows through with the seminar AMBADGER will remain [redacted] until it ends.

[redacted]

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
2 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

*File*

1. During a brief TDY stopover at Headquarters on 23 August 1966, QUSPORT-1 said he had talked with  on 22 August. According to QUSPORT-1,  had no additional pertinent information concerning his alleged inside contacts or his recent meeting  continues to insist that he has inside support  and contacts who are anti-regime and prepared to assist him when needed. He did not reveal to QUSPORT-1, however, who the people were or where they are located.



SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

201-239298

SECRET

- 2 -

3. I told QUSPORT to phone [ ] and assure him that I wanted him to pass all the details to AMBADGER even though according to QUSPORT-1's arrangement this was not necessary. QUSPORT-1 was unable, however, to reach [ ] by phone during the afternoon of 20 August.

4. About 8 p. m. on 20 August I received a collect phone call from AMBADGER [ ] AMBADGER was very excited and said he had to see me right away. After he settled down a bit he told me he had just left [ ] and his two local lieutenants [ ] [ ] He said [ ] had contacted him and the four of them discussed the possibility of defecting a Cuban MIG pilot and having him bring out his plane. In essence and from what I could discuss over the phone the details were substantially the same as those given to me by QUSPORT-1 earlier in the day. AMBADGER said he needed my guidance right away and further urged me to come [ ] to discuss the matter with [ ] who was pressing AMBADGER to see me. He said he had agreed to see [ ] later that night. I told AMBADGER I could not make the trip in the next few days and that further there were a few basic facts I needed to convince me that [ ] really had the potential to pull off the operation. I told AMBADGER to see [ ] later that evening and to try and determine the following:

- a. Name of the MIG pilot.
- b. Military field where he is stationed.
- c. Type MIG he flies.
- d. [ ] commo if any with the pilot.
- e. Estimated timing for the defection, i. e., has the pilot indicated he was ready to defect and awaiting instructions, etc.

I asked AMBADGER to phone me if he could develop any further information. AMBADGER phoned [ ] on the afternoon of 24 August to report he had attempted to obtain further details [ ] following his conversations with the writer but that [ ] had replied he did not know the name of the pilot or other details of the operation. (See [ ] memo attached)

SECRET



SECRET


- 3 -

5. As soon as time permits I plan a short trip [redacted] to see AMBADGER and to sit down [redacted] and try and clear up many of the obvious questions concerning his [redacted] contacts and the MIG pilot.




SECRET.





SECRET



24 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MIG 21


1. Approximately 2030 hours on 23 August 1966 DC/WH/C [redacted] called me to report that he had just received a call from AMBADGER [redacted] AMBADGER had a report from AMBANG that agents of his [redacted] were prepared to fly a MIG 21 to the United States. [redacted] asked AMBADGER for more information but AMBANG claimed that he did not have any additional details. (In view of AMBANG's previous reluctance to source his information there is always a certain skepticism about AMBANG's claims of accomplishments.) [redacted] told AMBADGER to find out from AMBANG the who, where, why, what, when, and how and to report back. AMBANG stated that he did not have this information but they planned to go ahead with the operation. [redacted] told him that if a Cuban pilot wanted to fly a MIG 21 to the U.S. we could do nothing to stop him.

2. At 1400 hours on this date AMBADGER called me to report that he had discussed [redacted] suggestions with AMBANG who had replied that he honestly didn't know the name of the pilot or the details of the operation. In short, he had been informed by a contact of his in Cuba that some of his people were going to steal a MIG 21. (AMBADGER commented that AMBANG did not appear to be evasive or reluctant to discuss the matter but apparently didn't know the details.) In any event, AMBANG stated that they were going ahead with the operation [redacted]


[redacted] thought that the chance of losing the aircraft outweighed the possible gain. I suggested that if they were going ahead with the operation anyway it would be of more value to just get the aircraft. AMBADGER replied that AMBANG appeared adamant in this respect and wanted to be certain that if the operation was successful that he be allowed to take all the credit for it. I replied that if in fact he was responsible for the operation he could have all the credit.

3. I have called [redacted] U.S. Air Force, [redacted] and informed him that there is the "possibility" of a MIG 21 pilot defecting to the U.S. in his aircraft. He in turn has alerted the Southeast Air Defense Command who will be on the alert for such a possibility.

[redacted] 201-237297









25

[Redacted]

Chief, [Redacted]

Chief of Station [Redacted]

Chief of Station [Redacted]

YETRAY/BLACK/AMRANG-1 Contact with 201-772270 [Redacted]

Act: For your information

- Ref: A. [Redacted] ID-4826
- B. [Redacted] ID-4427
- C. [Redacted] ID-4526
- D. [Redacted] ID-4488

1. The following information supplemental to references was acquired during two Station meetings with AMRANG-1 (21 and 23 June 1946) and several meetings with QUBONT-1 during the same period.

2. AMRANG-1 expects that Subject (201-772270) will be returning [Redacted] in the near future. (In relation to the return of Subject [Redacted] Subject told QUBONT-1 on 12 July that he had received permission to return and had discussed this with AMJMAL-1 earlier that same day.) Although AMRANG-1 expressed doubts concerning the character and general reputation of Subject, he nevertheless felt that Subject, in conjunction with his brother (201-724152), had potential for contact within military circles [Redacted]

3. In general no definite plans were made during the conversations between AMRANG-1 and Subject [Redacted]. However, various means of communication were established for future contact:

A. Mail. AMRANG-1 gave Subject three different mail drops [Redacted]

[Redacted] for his correspondence to AMRANG-1 [Redacted]

B. Telephone. In the event that telephone contact is desired, Subject is to call [Redacted]

Distribution:  
 2-C/ENR  
 2-IC/SM/C  
 2-ICG, JENAVE

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-756482

OSMA-21570

20 July 1946

201-239298

E B C R E T/RYBAT

201-772270  
901-400908

C. Personal Meetings. The following plan was established for personal meetings. Subject will send a picture of a boat that is utilized by INDER for excursions to AMBANG-1 via mail drop. It appears that INDER has boats which are rented to sportsmen for deep sea fishing trips. AMBANG-1, in turn, will attempt to procure a boat identical to that in the picture sent by Subject. Accordingly, on given instructions the boat rented by INDER will depart from a point heading for another port. All official communication regarding the clearances necessary for the INDER boat will be made by INDER prior to the departure of the boat. The INDER boat would then depart heading out to sea. The two boats (the INDER boat and the identical boat acquired by AMBANG-1) will rendez-vous on high seas and make appropriate exchanges; then the INDER boat will return to its port of destination.

D. Contact with 201-736492. the contact between AMBANG-1 and 201-736492 will be made through a cousin of Subject's family.

4. AMBANG-1 commented that he had a 102-foot boat which he is willing and intends to use. He lamented the fact that approximately 300,000 worth of arms had been lost as a result of the insurrection in that country.

Leslie H. HENDRIQUE